Modelling Major Projects: 
What are the Factors that Determine 
Net Social Benefits?

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Abstract: Economic impact statements are part and parcel of project proponents seeking government assistance, infrastructure, or environmental clearance. Such impact assessments are increasingly being conducted with computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Frequently, however, CGE modellers do not report results in economic welfare terms nor give sufficient attention to the proper simulation requirements for determining net social benefits correctly. In this paper we take the example of a major mining project in the Western Australian region and model it under a variety of stylized scenarios in order to demonstrate the key determinants of an economic welfare measure, gross national disposable income (GNDI). We show that GNDI is sensitive to such factors as: terms of trade effects; profitability; public concessions and infrastructure; cost of foreign financing; and taxation of foreign-owned returns.

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1. INTRODUCTION

For many years now, virtually all major new projects and events in Australia have been accompanied by an economic impact study. The proponents of private projects, particular in the areas of mining and manufacturing, may be motivated by the need to get environmental or other regulatory clearance, or a desire to support their case for publically-funded infrastructure to accompany the project, or perhaps to bolster their request for some form of assistance. Similarly governments seek favourable research findings that might assist in justifying large public expenditure on infrastructure and other major investments.

Since the early 1990’s, such impact studies in Australia have been conducted largely with computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Typically, these studies report results in terms of the impacts on real GDP and employment. While, CGE results are naturally conditioned by aggregate resource constraints on the economy, it is not unusual for these studies to report very large economic impacts, at times not all that much lower than the unconstrained input-output (IO) models that preceded them. For instance, Madden (2006) reports CGE estimates of the economic impact of the Sydney Olympic Games on GDP that were within the broad neighbourhood of I/O estimates. However, the two methods provided very different results for the impact on a measure of economic welfare, real consumption.

In the normal course of events, it is to be expected that a profitable project gives rise to an increase in GDP through returns to the newly installed capital. Many CGE studies also allow for a short-term impact on employment that also temporarily adds to GDP. This assumption, however, has been less popular through the course of the present decade, one in which Australian labour markets
have been tight, and in which economists have sought to keep project analysis separate from counter-cyclical policies.

While a project that will increase a nation’s effective capital stock, will add to the present value of GDP, it need not have a similar effect on the present value of real consumption. In order to create the new capital it is necessary that some (public or private) consumption be forgone while the investment occurs (i.e. funding through domestic savings) or that there be an increase in external obligations (i.e. funding out of foreign savings). Recognizing this helps identify the sources of welfare gain from a project. Key factors are: the productivity of a project (i.e. private profitability, and the degree to which it relies on government inputs such as infrastructure, tax concessions and the like), the cost of foreign financing, the degree of taxation of foreign-owned profits, and effects on the terms-of-trade.

In this paper, we concentrate on those factors which relate to the distribution of project returns between domestic and foreign economic agents. We conduct simulations with a dynamic CGE model for a typical (hypothetical) project over a 15-year period under 20 different scenarios relating to the degree of foreign ownership, the rate of tax on capital returns and the rate of a natural resource rent tax.

2. THE MONASH MULTI-REGIONAL FORECASTING MODEL (MMRF)

2.1 MMRF Overview
MMRF is a dynamic multi-regional CGE model. When implemented in its full regional detail, it explicitly models the behaviour of economic agents within each of Australia’s 8 states and territories. For this paper, we use a two-region (Western Australia and rest of Australia) implementation of the model. The model features detailed sectoral disaggregation, identifying 65 industries and commodities. Neoclassical assumptions govern the behaviour of the model’s economic agents. Each of the 65 representative industries operating within each of the 2 regions is assumed to minimise costs subject to constant-returns-to-scale production technologies and given input prices. A representative utility-
maximising household resides in each of the model’s 2 regions. Investors allocate new capital to industries on the basis of expected rates of return. Units of new capital are assumed to be a cost-minimising combination of inputs sourced from each of the model’s 3 sources of supply (the 2 domestic regions plus imports). Imperfect substitutability between the imported and 2 domestic sources of supply for each commodity are modelled using the CES assumption of Armington. In general, markets are assumed to clear and to be competitive. Purchaser’s prices differ from basic prices by the value of indirect taxes and margin services. Taxes and margins can differ across commodity, user, region of source and region of destination. Foreign demands for each of the 65 commodities from each of the 2 regions are modelled as inversely related to their foreign currency prices. The model includes details of the taxing, spending and transfer activities of two levels of government: a regional government operating within each region, and a federal government operating Australia-wide. Inter-governmental transfer payments and personal transfer payments to households are also modelled. Dynamic equations describe stock-flow relationships, such as those between regional industry capital stocks and regional industry investment levels. Dynamic adjustment equations allow for the gradual movement of a number of variables towards their long-run values. For example, the national real wage is assumed to be sticky in the short-run, adjusting over a period of about five years to return the level of national employment to its base-case level following an economic shock. Equality of deviations in regional real consumer wages across regions is maintained through labour movements between regions. Regional economic linkages arise from inter-regional trade, factor mobility, the taxing and spending activities of the federal government, and long-run economy-wide employment and balance of trade constraints. The model also evaluates a full set of national and regional income accounts, and associated deflators. The reader is referred to Naqvi and Peter (1996) and Peter et al. (1996) for a detailed discussion of the model. The model is solved with the GEMPACK economic modelling software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996).
2.2 Enhancements to the MMRF model for this paper

A number of developments have been made to the standard MMRF model to facilitate the simulations conducted for this study. These involved building into the model's theory and database two new nascent or embryonic industries: one representing the construction activity associated with the development of the hypothetical project, and one representing the operating activity of the hypothetical project. These new industries are characterised by the cost and sales structures of the construction and operating phases of the project. These cost and sales structures are based on the project’s financial aggregates as discussed in Section 2.4, expanded to the model’s full commodity and sourcing detail using relevant input cost shares of the WA mining industry as represented in the standard MMRF database. As discussed in Section 2.4, we describe the project via time paths for:

1. capital expenditure;
2. sales;
3. payments for intermediate inputs and labour;
4. capital returns;
5. natural resource rent tax payments; and
6. repatriated foreign capital and interest income.

To implement in the model the operations of the project, we require further information on the composition of its inputs and the sales destination of its outputs. On the output side, we assume all sales are destined for the export market. On the operational input side, our thumbnail financial assumptions described in Section 2.4 allow us to tie-down important aggregates such as:

1. the total value of payments for intermediate inputs and labour;
2. total capital payments; and
3. natural resource rent tax payments.

However, to model the projects explicitly in MMRF, we must divide the total value of intermediate inputs and labour into:
1. the basic value of intermediate inputs, distinguished by commodity and source;
2. the value of margin payments associated with individual source- and commodity-specific intermediate inputs;
3. the value of indirect taxes paid on purchases of individual source- and commodity-specific intermediate inputs; and
4. payments to labour.

To provide this compositional information, we used the relevant input shares of the existing MMRF WA Iron Ore industry. We divided capital expenditure into its source, commodity, basic value, margin value and indirect tax components in the same way, using the input-composition of the MMRF WA Iron Ore construction activity as a template. With the input-output composition of the project’s operations and construction activities thus specified, we introduce these activities to the model’s database as very tiny industries. In our simulations, variables determining the levels of the operations and construction activities of these new industries are shocked by amounts sufficient to ensure they follow the time paths specified in Section 2.4. Shocks reflecting these time paths are implemented in both the basecase (no project) simulation and the counterfactual (project) simulation. In the basecase (no project) simulation, the embryonic industries are maintained at their initial tiny size. The counterfactual (project) simulation is identical to the basecase simulation in all respects other than that the hypothetical project is expanded up to its full size via exogenous determination of the project’s investment spending and foreign demand for its output.

2.3 Simulation design

In generating all our results, we model the economy over two time paths, covering the period 2008 to 2026:

1. Basecase scenario. We run a basecase scenario. The basecase scenario is a projection for the national and state economies, compiled on the assumption that the hypothetical project does not occur.
2. Counterfactual scenarios. We run many project scenarios. These scenarios show the effects of the construction and operating phases of the project, under different assumptions related to:

i. the extent of foreign ownership of the project;

ii. the rate of capital income tax applying to the project; and

iii. the rate of resource rent taxation.

We report impacts on a number of key economic variables. The effects are reported as differences between the values of the variables in the project scenario and their values in the basecase scenario. As we noted in the introduction, of the variables we report, aggregate real consumption is the relevant variable for assessment of the economic welfare consequences of the project.

2.4 Other assumptions

2.4.1 Specification of the hypothetical project

We describe the hypothetical project by specifying:

\[ SALES_n \] The value of project sales in year \( n \). We assume all project output is exported.

\[ INTRM_n \] The value of intermediate commodities used as an input to project operations in year \( n \).

\[ LABOR_n \] The value of the project’s wagebill in year \( n \).

\[ INV_n \] Project investment in year \( n \).

\[ CAPTAX \] The effective corporate tax rate applying to the project.

\[ NRRTAX \] The effective natural resource rent tax rate applying to the project.

\[ FINSHR_{Debt} \] The share of debt in the project’s total financing cost.

\[ r_{Debt} \] Cost of foreign debt finance to the project.

\[ OWNSHR_{Foreign} \] The share of the enterprise that is beneficially foreign owned.

\[ FINSHR_{Equity} \] The share of equity in the project’s total financing cost \((1 - FINSHR_{Debt})\).

\[ OWNSHR_{Domestic} \] Share of the enterprise that is beneficially domestically owned \((1 - OWNSHR_{Foreign})\).
Given our assumptions for the values of the above, we can determine the hypothetical project’s gross operating surplus \((GOS_n)\) and pre-tax accounting profit \((PROFIT_n)\) as follows:

\[
(1) \quad GOS_n = SALES_n(1 - NRRTAX) - INTRM_n - LABOR_n
\]

\[
(2) \quad PROFIT_n = GOS_n - \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{n} INV_t \right] \times FINSHR_{Debt} \times r_Debt
\]

For our simulations, we must specify values for \(INV_n\), \(SALES_n\), \(INTRM_n\), \(LABOR_n\), \(FINSHR_{Debt}\), \(r_{Debt}\), \(CAPTAX\), \(NRRTAX\), and \(OWNSHR_{Foreign}\).

Our assumptions for these values are outlined below.

(A) The project is constructed over three years. Annual investment is $1,070 m. That is, \(INV_t = 1070\) for \(t = 2008-2010\) inclusive.

(B) The project commences operations in year four (2011) and ceases operations after twelve years (2022). Annual sales, all of which are exported, are $2,000 m. That is, \(SALES_n = 2000\) for \(t = 2011-2022\) inclusive.

(C) The annual value of intermediate inputs is $750 m. That is, \(INTRM_n = 750\) for \(t = 2011-2022\) inclusive.

(D) The annual wagebill is $150 m. That is, \(LABOR_n = 150\) for \(t = 2011-2022\) inclusive.

(E) The debt/equity ratio is 1. That is, \(FINSHR_{Debt} = FINSHR_{Equity} = 0.50\).

(F) The cost of debt finance for the project is 8%. That is, \(r_{Debt} = 0.08\).

In all simulations, assumptions (A) to (F) are unchanged. With assumptions (A) to (D) in place, the project generates a pre-tax IRR of 25 per cent, a typical hurdle rate for Australian natural resource extraction projects.

Our paper investigates the effects of varying assumptions (G) to (I):

(G) We vary the project-specific effective capital tax rate, \(CAPTAX\), between 0.30 and 0.

(H) We vary the project-specific effective natural resource rent tax, \(NRRTAX\), between 0.05 and -0.05. For values of NRRTAX below 0, we are investigating the effects of subsidising the project.

(I) We vary the share of the project’s equity that is foreign owned, \(OWNSHR_{Foreign}\), between 1 and 0.

2.4.2 Private and public consumption.

In both the basecase and project scenarios, we assume that national consumption (private plus public) is a fixed proportion of gross national disposable income.
(GNDI). Hence, at the national level, the percentage deviation in real consumption (private plus public) is equal to the percentage deviation in real (consumption price deflated) GNDI. To calculate GNDI, we must explicitly account for project-related financing costs. In particular, we must calculate the amount of project income that is repatriated in each year of the basecase and project scenarios. To do this, we must understand how the nation (not simply the project owner) finances project-related construction spending. Equation (3) summarises our project financing assumptions.

\[
REPAT_n = \left[ \sum_{t=1}^{n} INV_t \right] \times FINSHR_{Debt} \times r_{Debt} + \\
PROFIT_t \times (1 - CAPTAX) \times OWNSHR_{Foreign} + \\
\left[ \sum_{t=1}^{n} INV_t \right] \times (FINSHR_{Equity}) \times OWNSHR_{Domestic} \times r_{For}
\]

where:

\(REPAT_n\) is project-related net primary factor payments to non-residents in year \(n\); and

\(r_{For}\) is the foregone rate of return / cost of foreign capital faced by domestic owners of the project.

In specifying \(r_{For}\), we assume \(r_{Debt} = r_{For} = 8\%^{ii}\).

Equation (3) recognises that project-related repatriation of primary factor income is comprised of three parts. The first term on the right hand side of equation (3) relates to the cost of debt financing. So that we need not adjust basecase or project consumption paths to reflect changes in the holding of project debt by domestic agents, we assume that all of the debt financing is ultimately raised offshore. Hence interest payments on the debt component of the project’s financing costs are repatriated. The second and third terms capture the cost of equity finance. The second term captures repatriation of the foreign-owned share of project-related post-tax profits. The third term measures the opportunity cost to domestic shareholders of project-related financing from retained profits. We assume that domestic shareholders forego a foreign rate of return of 8% on the earnings that
are retained by the project for investment financing. Alternatively, the third term can be interpreted as the foreign cost of capital to domestic shareholders, under a scenario in which the project finances the equity component of its project-related capital costs via expansion of issued shares, with such shares acquired by domestic and foreign agents in proportion to the initial domestic/foreign ownership ratio.

With aggregate national consumption spending a fixed proportion of GNDI, our final task is to determine the split between private and public consumption. We assume that real public consumption spending by regional governments is indexed to real private consumption spending in the region. We assume that real federal public consumption spending is indexed to real private consumption spending at the national level. With private and public consumption spending thus moving in fixed proportions, the welfare consequences of the project must be calculated as the sum of the deviations in private and public consumption spending.

2.4.3 Labour markets
At the national level, we hold economy-wide employment fixed at its basecase level in each year of the policy scenario, reflecting a situation of full employment. Labour is free to move between state economies. We assume that labour moves between regions so as to maintain initial inter-state wage differentials.

2.4.4 Rates of return on capital
In deviation simulations MMRF allows for short-run divergences in rates of return on industry capital stocks from their levels in the basecase forecasts. Such divergences cause divergences in investment and capital stocks. The divergences in capital stocks gradually erode the divergences in rates of return.

2.4.5 Production technologies
MMRF contains many types of technical change variables. In the project scenario we assume that all technology variables have the same values as in the basecase scenario.
3. RESULTS

3.1 National and regional impacts under a Central Case Scenario

We begin by reporting results for a Central Case in which:

i. The capital tax rate is 30% ($CAPTAX = 0.30$).

ii. The natural resource rent tax is 5% ($NRRTAX = 0.05$).

iii. The project’s capital is owned equally by foreign and domestic agents ($OWNSHR_{Foreign} = OWNSHR_{Domestic} = 0.50$).

Key national macroeconomic results are reported in Charts 1 and 2. Selected regional macroeconomic results are reported in Charts 3 – 6. We begin by considering the project construction phase (2008 – 2010 inclusive). For the first three years of the simulation period, the national real investment deviation is positive (Chart 2), reflecting project-specific investment spending. Real GDP is largely unaffected by the construction phase (Chart 1). The Australian macroeconomic climate is one of full employment (see discussion in introductory section). Hence in every year of the project simulation we hold employment at its basecase level. With employment unchanged, and capital stocks adjusting slowly, there is little scope for the project investment phase to positively affect real GDP. Indeed, in Chart 1 we see that the investment phase causes a slight negative deviation in real GDP. With real GDP largely unaffected by project investment, the real balance of trade must move towards deficit. In Chart 2, this is manifested as a negative export deviation and positive import deviation over the first three years of the simulation. This movement towards trade deficit requires the real exchange rate to appreciate (Chart 2). The resulting crowding out of capital intensive trade-exposed industries accounts for the small negative real GDP deviation in the second and third years of the project construction phase.

The negative export deviation during the project’s construction phase causes the terms of trade to improve. The positive terms of trade deviation allows the deviation in real (consumption price deflated) gross national disposable income
(GNDI) to exceed the deviation in real GDP. Since we assume that consumption (private and public) is a fixed share of GNDI, the consumption deviation exceeds the GDP deviation over 2008 – 2010 (Chart 1).

While the project investment phase has little impact on national real GDP, it does alter the regional distribution of primary factors, and thus does affect real gross regional product (GRP).

Project-specific investment causes a sharp positive deviation in WA real investment over 2008-2010 (Chart 4). This accounts for the positive deviation in WA employment over this period (Chart 6). Since national employment is held at its basecase level in each year of the project simulation, WA’s employment gain must be RoA’s employment loss (Chart 6). This accounts for the decline in real GDP in RoA (Chart 3). The positive deviation in WA investment places pressure on fixed (land) and sticky (capital) factors in the region. This causes prices in WA to rise relative to those in the RoA (Chart 5). The positive deviation in relative WA prices accounts for the negative deviations in WA interstate and foreign exports. Together with the increase in investment activity in WA, the rise in relative WA prices also explains part of the positive deviation in interstate and foreign imports into WA (Chart 4).

Project operations occur over 2011 – 2022. The project’s gross operating surplus and natural resource rent tax fully account for the positive real GDP deviation (Chart 1). As discussed in Section 2.4.2, we allow consumption spending to be a fixed proportion of GNDI. Our GNDI calculation takes explicit account of repatriation of foreign profits and interest payments. In the Central Case just under half ($498 m.) of the project’s capital returns (GOS plus NRRT = 1100) are repatriated to foreign suppliers of capital. The remainder is available for domestic consumption. Since only part of the real GDP gain is available for domestic consumption, the real consumption deviation during the project operating phase must lie below the real GDP deviation (Chart 1). This causes the real balance of trade to move towards surplus (Chart 2). Despite the movement towards surplus in
the balance of trade, the deviation in the real devaluation index remains negative, reflecting real appreciation (Chart 2). We assume that all of the project’s output is exported. The project’s exports alone are more than sufficient to generate the movement towards surplus implied by the gap between consumption and GDP in Chart 1. Hence real appreciation is required to crowd-out activity in other traded goods industries. Since these industries tend to be capital intensive, the negative deviations in activity in these industries accounts for the negative deviation in national investment during the project operating phase (Chart 2).

Chart 3 reports real gross regional product (GRP) deviations. The sizeable deviation in WA’s real GRP simply reflects the physical location of the project in this region. The expansion in WA’s real GRP requires labour to move from the rest of Australia (Chart 6). This accounts for the contraction in real GRP in the rest of Australia (Chart 3). The expansion in WA’s economic activity places demand pressure on fixed and sticky factors (land and capital respectively). For land, this results in an increase in rental prices that lasts the duration of the project’s operating phase. For capital, it causes a short-run increase in capital rental prices, but a long-run increase in capital supply. This accounts for the positive but declining deviation in WA prices during the project’s operating phase (Chart 5). The rise in relative WA prices places pressure on trade-exposed sectors in WA. This accounts for the negative deviation in WA interstate exports (Chart 4). Together with the expansion in WA economic activity, it also accounts for the positive deviations in WA interstate and foreign imports (Chart 4). The negative deviation in WA prices following the cessation of project operations reflects excess capacity. The positive deviation in WA real GRP over 2011 – 2022 induces capital supply into WA sectors only indirectly related to the project. For example, capacity slowly expands in sectors supplying consumption goods to the expanded WA workforce. With the cessation of project operations in 2023, capital is in excess supply in WA, requiring WA capital rental prices to fall. This causes the WA price level to fall (Chart 5). It also accounts for the negative deviation in real WA investment in the last years of the simulation period (Chart 4). The magnitude of the negative WA price deviation declines over time as investors
gradually adjust the WA capital stock to the new lower level required following cessation of project operations.

### 3.2 Economic impact versus welfare under alternative ownership and tax assumptions

We undertake 20 variations on the Central Case discussed in Section 3.1. Our aim is to show that changes in tax and ownership assumptions have little effect on the “economic impact” of the project, as traditionally measured by real GDP deviation, but do have a substantial effect on our welfare measure, real national consumption.

Recall that under the Central Case, discussed in detail in Section 3.1, we assumed $CAPTAX = 0.30$, $OWNSHR_{Foreign} = 0.50$, and $NRRTAX = 0.05$. In this section, we discuss real GDP and real consumption results under 20 combinations of values for $CAPTAX$, $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ and $NRRTAX$. We group these into four sets of five simulations each:

- **Set I**: 5 simulations in which we set $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ alternatively at 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75; 1.00; with $CAPTAX = 0.30$ and $NRRTAX = 0.05$.
- **Set II**: 5 simulations in which we set $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ alternatively at 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75; 1.00; with $CAPTAX = 0.15$ and $NRRTAX = 0.05$.
- **Set III**: 5 simulations in which we set $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ alternatively at 0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75; 1.00; with $CAPTAX = 0.00$ and $NRRTAX = 0.05$.
- **Set IV**: 5 simulations in which we set $NRRTAX$ alternatively at 0.05, 0.025, 0.00, -0.025, -0.050; with $CAPTAX = 0.00$ and $OWNSHR_{Foreign} = 1.00$.

Chart 7 reports the percentage deviations in real GDP under the 20 combinations of $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$, $CAPTAX$ and $NRRTAX$ outlined above. It is clear from Chart 7 that the real GDP deviation is insensitive to changes in these parameters. However the national real consumption deviation is sensitive to changes in $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$, $CAPTAX$ and $NRRTAX$, because changes in these parameters
affect the distribution of project capital returns between domestic and foreign agents. We explore real consumption effects below.

Chart 8 reports deviations in national real aggregate consumption ($m.) under the Central Case assumptions relating to $CAPTAX$ and $NRRTAX$, but with $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ ranging over five values from 0 to 1. Higher values for $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ are associated with lower real consumption deviations. The cause is clear from Equation (3): with $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ higher, so too is $REPAT_n$. As discussed in Section 2.4.2, we assume that consumption is a fixed share of GNDI. By definition, GNDI is calculated net of $REPAT_n$.

However, foreign owners of the project can repatriate only post tax profits. From Equation (3) it is clear that, ceteris paribus, lower values for $CAPTAX$ will be associated with higher values for $REPAT_n$. Hence, given that domestic consumption is from GNDI, lower values for $CAPTAX$ will be associated with lower real consumption deviations. Charts 9 and 10 report MMRF real consumption deviations for the simulations defined by Sets II and III above – that is – project-specific $CAPTAX$ at 15% and 00% respectively under alternative values for $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$.

The relationship between domestic real consumption and alternative values for $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ and $CAPTAX$ is made clearer by Chart 11. Together, Charts 8 to 10 report real consumption deviations for 15 combinations of $OWNSHR_{Foreign}$ and $CAPTAX$ with $NRRTAX$ held fixed at 0.05. Chart 11 plots the net present value of these 15 real consumption deviations, linking observations of given values for $CAPTAX$. Chart 11 makes clear that the capital tax rate is irrelevant to the national welfare calculation where the project is entirely domestically owned. Under complete domestic ownership, $CAPTAX$ merely determines the allocation of the project’s surplus between domestic private and public sectors, leaving GNDI unaffected.
Our fourth set of simulations investigates scenarios in which substantial tax concessions are offered to the new project. In simulation Set IV, we assume that $OWNSHR_{Foreign} = 1$ and $CAPTAX = 0$, and investigate the effects of progressively lowering the natural resource rent tax ($NRRTAX$), from its typical value of 5%, down to a production subsidy of 5%. Chart 12 reports real consumption deviations under alternative values for $NRRTAX$. Even with the resource rent tax at 0, and no company tax collected from the project, a small welfare gain remains under 100 per cent foreign ownership. This reflects real consumption gains from the positive deviation in the terms of trade. The real consumption deviation is negative under a 5% production subsidy and no capital taxation. Provision of a direct production subsidy in the real world is unlikely. However public provision of what is essentially private infrastructure is common. In particular, major projects typically come with private sector demands for substantial public infrastructure investments. In terms of the project’s private (post $NRRTAX$) IRR, the 5% production subsidy is equivalent to public financing of 17% of the project’s initial physical capital requirements.

4. CONCLUSIONS

It is customary for economic modelling studies of major projects to report their results in terms of economic impacts on output and employment. GDP results are often Headlined as though this variable is a good indicator of the economic benefits of a project. In this paper we demonstrate that the GDP impact serves as a poor proxy for the effect on economic welfare. We undertake a wide range of scenarios which demonstrate that while the real GDP deviation hardly varies under changes in tax and ownership assumptions, these assumptions have a substantial effect on the economic welfare results.

We thus conclude that CGE modellers should pay less attention in reporting their results on the economic impacts of a project, and focus their attention more on the consequences of the particular project for economic welfare. Only then will their
results form a proper basis for assessing the benefits that individual projects might bring.

REFERENCES


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CHART 12: Real consumption deviations ($m.) under alternative resource rent taxes (CAPTAX=0.00, OWNSHR_Foreign=1)

- Resource rent tax = 5.0%
- Resource rent tax = 2.5%
- Resource rent tax = 0.0%
- Resource rent tax = -2.5%
- Resource rent tax = -5.0%
Our paper reports results for dozens of simulations undertaken over a lengthy forecasting run. The full 8-states implementation of the model takes a substantial time to run. With no loss of generality to our research findings, significant computational time is saved by implementing a two region (a region of focus – Western Australia, and the rest of Australia) implementation of the model.

In distinguishing $r_{dom}$ and $r_{for}$, we anticipate scenarios in which rates of return on investment opportunities available to domestic shareholders and the cost of foreign debt to the firm may differ.

The fifteen sets of flows are in constant dollars. In calculating the NPV values plotted in Chart 11, we discount these flows at a real rate of 5 per cent.